Branislav L. Slantchev - Military Threats; The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace (2011).pdf

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Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace
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Military Threats
Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must
states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? Slantchev shows
that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when
they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic forms of communication, physical
military moves improve a state’s expected performance in war. If the opponent
believes the threat, it will be more likely to back down. Military moves are also
inherently costly, so only resolved states are willing to pay these costs. Slantchev
argues that powerful states can secure better peaceful outcomes and lower the
risk of war, but the likelihood of war depends on the extent to which a state is
prepared to use military threats to deter challenges to peace and compel conces-
sions without fi ghting. The price of peace may therefore be large: states invest in
military forces that are both costly and unused.
BRANISLAV L . SLANTCHEV is Associate Professor in the Department of
Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. He specializes in the
use of game theory to study international confl ict, negotiations, and the political
economy of war fi nance.
Military Threats
The Costs of Coercion and
the Price of Peace
Branislav L. Slantchev
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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521763189
© Branislav L. Slantchev 2011
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 201
Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge
This book was typeset in LaTeX by the author
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ISBN 978-0-521-76318-9 Hardback
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