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doi:10.1080/13698010500515241
EDWARD W. SAID: TRUTH, JUSTICE
AND NATIONALISM
Jan Selby
University of Sussex, UK
................ Within post-colonial debates, Edward Said has tended to be viewed by critics and
admirers alike through a predominantly postmodern lens: as an (albeit
inconsistent) Foucauldian genealogist of the relations between western truths
and oriental subjugation, and as an opponent of cultural homogeneity and
advocate of hybridity and exile. This paper argues, by contrast, that Said was
above all a critical modernist committed to truth and justice; that despite his
opposition to pure identities he was not anti-nationalist; and that he was
remarkably consistent, both philosophically and politically, across a lengthy
period of at least twenty-five years. In his desire to ‘speak truth to power’ and in
his ethical universalism, Said had much deeper affinities, the paper argues, with
Noam Chomsky than with Michel Foucault. It was this critical modernism, I
argue, that underlay Said’s belief that nationalist movements could be of
progressive and liberatory potential, and that also underlay his critiques of
mainstream propaganda on the question of Palestine, as well as his ambivalent
positions on the utility of the two-state solution.
Foucault
Chomsky
nationalism
Palestine
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interventions Vol. 8(1) 40 / 55 (ISSN 1369-801X print/1469-929X online)
Copyright # 2006 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13698010500515241
Said
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EDWARD W. SAID: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND NATIONALISM
........................
Jan Selby
It has become almost commonplace to charge Edward Said and his work
with inconsistency, even hypocrisy. The list of objections that have been
made is long indeed. For not only did Said deploy Foucault alongside
Gramsci in Orientalism (1991) [1978]), and T. S. Eliot alongside Fanon in
Culture and Imperialism (1994a [1993]) / in a manner that elided their
intellectual as well as political differences. Not only did Said juxtapose
searing denunciations of the racism inherent within ‘western thought’
(claiming of the nineteenth century that ‘every European, in what he could
say about the Orient, was ...a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally
ethnocentric’) with, on the other hand, a quite conservative preference for
that same humanist tradition (1991 [1978]: 204, 2004). Not only would Said
move, epistemologically, between Nietzschean critiques of objectivity
(‘truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they
are’) and Chomsky-like exhortations of the importance of ‘speaking truth to
power’ (Nietzsche 1954; Said 1991 [1978]: 203, 1994b: ch. 5). Not only did
Said (1999a) think of himself, biographically, as an ‘out of place’ exile and a
homeless outsider / despite his privileged background and his professional
location near the centre of liberal American culture. Not only did Said, for
some, walk a tightrope between being a detached literary scholar, on the one
hand, and pro-Palestinian polemicist, on the other / ‘Yasser Arafat’s man in
New York’, as one headline had it (Smith 1989). Not only this, but Said was
also seemingly unsure on certain directly political issues relating to the plight
and future of the Palestinians. Thus for many he appeared to combine a
hostility towards the nation-state and nationalism, with his well-known and
forceful championing of the Palestinian right to self-determination. Said also,
it is often claimed, switched from support for a two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the 1980s and 1990s, to advocacy of a
single bi-national state in the years before his death. The question necessarily
poses itself: what are we to make of all these supposed switches, tensions and
contradictions?
It seems to me that there are at least four possible answers. One could
respond that Said’s arguments were indeed ‘distinctly schizophrenic’,
however provocative and productive they might have been (Said in fact
admits as much of Orientalism , adding / a touch disingenuously perhaps /
that ‘I designed it that way’) (Mackenzie 1995: 5; Salusinszky 1987: 137).
One could respond, alternatively, as Joan Cocks does in this volume and
elsewhere, that the tensions within Said’s writings and life are testimony to
the ‘inevitability of subjective contradictions in human beings’ (2002: 150)
and are important and interesting precisely for that reason. Alternatively
again, one could interpret Said’s shifting and equivocal positions as a very
practical function of the diverse and fast-changing problems and audiences
which his work endeavoured and struggled to address, ranging from
questions of literary theory to the problem of Middle East peace, from the
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era of Third Worldist post-colonial struggle to the contemporary ascendancy
of American neo-liberal imperialism. Or, fourth and finally, one might want
to insist that Said simply was not as inconsistent as may at first appear, and
that the antinomies and reversals that so pervade his thought are often
misread, and are not necessarily founded on logical contradictions.
There is something to be said, I think, for each of these interpretations, but
I want here to explore the latter two in particular since it is these which shed
most light, in my view, on the thorny question of nationalism, as well as on
the value of Said’s contributions. Said, let me assert first of all, was both
more consistent and much more modernist and humanist than is generally
recognized within postcolonial studies, and was not anti-nationalist (if by
that we imply hostility to the idea of nationhood, or to the institutional form
of the nation-state). Moreover, taken as a whole, Said’s oeuvre is sharply at
odds with the generally post-structuralist flavour of contemporary post-
colonial studies, this being true both of his substantive theoretical orienta-
tions, as well as of his stylistic and political distaste for the ‘generally
hermetic, jargon-ridden, unthreatening combativeness’ (Said 2004: 125) of
the modern academy. The irony, of course, is that Said and Orientalism in
particular were the formative influences on the field of postcolonial studies,
and continue to be key reference points in its development. Yet this, it seems
to me, is precisely where one of the main problems of interpretation arises,
namely that Said’s use of Foucault within his extraordinarily influential
Orientalism , combined with his deployment and articulation of some of the
key tropes of post-structuralist and postcolonial theory / his concern with
texts, representations, identity, hybridity, exile, resistance, etc. / has tended
to result in critics and followers alike viewing Said through a predominantly
postmodern lens (Ashcroft and Ahluwalia 2001: 13 / 14). Equally, Said’s
celebration of exile and his opposition to cultural homogeneity has, within
the context of a postcolonial field strongly hostile to nationalism and
statism, too often been misread as an anti-nationalist position. I argue below
that, interpreted outside the fold of postcolonial studies, it becomes evident
that Said was neither as post-structuralist nor as anti-nationalist, nor indeed
as contradictory, as may otherwise appear.
That said, the inconsistencies in Said’s work cannot all be interpreted
away in this fashion, for others of them remain / and result largely, I think,
from the diversity of locations, issues and audiences to which he tried to
speak. Said spoke to more different types of audience, and on a wider range
of exceedingly difficult themes, than any other late twentieth-century
intellectual. Thus, if we compare him, for instance, with Noam Chomsky
/ the only comparable figure in American intellectual life / it becomes
readily apparent just how disparate were the audiences and problems that
Said addressed. Across his work on both cognitive linguistics and interna-
tional politics, Chomsky speaks and writes in a philosophically naturalist
interventions / 8:1
EDWARD W. SAID: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND NATIONALISM
........................
Jan Selby
and realist key, with few tensions between his approaches to the two issue
areas; in his work on international politics, moreover, his central aim has
consistently been to expose the lies and double standards which underpin the
foreign policies of the United States and its local allies (see, e.g., Chomsky
1972, 1991). Said, by contrast, spoke on a diverse range of literary, cultural
and political issues that often demanded quite different epistemological
starting points; and in his essays and articles on Middle East politics he
addressed not only the abuses of US and Israeli policy, but also the
deficiencies of Arab politics and society (and Said was also, of course, a
participant in debates within the Palestinian national movement). Add to this
Said’s ‘worldliness’ (Said 1983) and his pragmatically grounded commitment
to each of these problem areas, and it is little wonder, I think, that there are
so many twists and tensions across his work.
This paper attempts to develop these arguments in relation to both the
broad contours of Said’s thinking, and the specific questions of nationalism
and the Palestinians. I argue that Said was above all a critical modernist
committed to truth and justice; that he was not anti-nationalist; and that he
was remarkably consistent, both philosophically and politically, across a
lengthy period of twenty-five years. But I also suggest that Said did struggle
with the problem of addressing diverse ‘worlds’, this being reflected in
tensions across his work. The Said that emerges here is both less radical and
less inconsistent than the Said who features in most postcolonial studies.
Whether this is adds to or detracts from his work is a question I leave to one
side. I begin by summarizing Said’s views on truth, justice and critique, and
only in subsequent sections do I turn to the questions first of nationalism and
the nation-state, and then of Palestinian rights and the one- and two-state
solutions.
Truth, justice, critique
Perhaps the best place to start exploring Said’s basic orientations is a debate
that took place in 1971 between Foucault and Chomsky, during which the
two of them set out their very different approaches to human nature,
knowledge, power and justice (and during which the interviewer, the Dutch
anarchist Fons Elders, also repeatedly attempted to disrupt the gravitas of
the occasion by placing an orange wig on Foucault’s bald head) (Elders
1974: 133 / 97; Wilkin 1999). During this encounter Chomsky set out his
views that serious social theory and analysis must be founded on some
conception of human nature, that it is the task of social science to analyse
reality and discover truths in the service of freedom and justice, and that true
knowledge stands in an oppositional relationship with power (as he puts it
elsewhere with characteristic clarity, ‘it is the responsibility of intellectuals to
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tell the truth and to expose lies’) (1967: 257). Foucault disagreed entirely. In
his view, human nature, truth and justice simply did not exist as a-historical
abstracts outside discourse and society, against which reality could be
evaluated and critiqued; for him, to the contrary, claims about ‘human
nature’, ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ were always themselves premised on and
implicated in ceaseless struggles for power. For Chomsky, truth and justice
can and do oppose power; in Foucault’s view, a Nietzschean will-to-power
governed all.
The relevance of this here is that both philosophically and politically, Said
was much closer to the modernist thinking of Chomsky than to the
archetypally postmodernist thinking of Foucault. Said did, of course, draw
heavily upon Foucault in Orientalism , analysing European scholarship and
literature on the Arab-Islamic world as a system of power-knowledge in the
service of (and to some extent constitutive of) imperial domination. But
thereafter Said quickly moves away from Foucault’s position that ‘power
and knowledge directly imply one another’, arguing that Foucault had an
overly sympathetic and insufficiently oppositional ‘imagination of power’
and had succumbed to ‘political hopelessness’ (Foucault 1977: 27; Said
1986a, 1997: 18). Furthermore, even in Orientalism Said holds not only to
the possibility, but also to the actuality, of the transcendence of Oriental-
ism ’s will-to-power: ‘I would not have undertaken a book of this sort,’ he
asserts in its concluding chapter, ‘if I did not also believe that there is
scholarship that is not as corrupt, or at least as blind to human reality, as the
kind I have been mainly depicting’ (and Said then lists a range of vigilant
individual scholars / Clifford Geertz, Maxime Rodinson, Roger Owen and
others / whose work he views as not dominated and disciplined by the ‘guild
tradition of Orientalism’) (1991 [1978]: 326). For Said, the central cause of
contemporary Orientalism is not some universal will-to-truth inherent even
within the best of scholarship, but rather ‘intellectual dishonesty’ and
‘dogmatic slumber’ (1991 [1978]: 327). Said acknowledges that this espousal
of a ‘non-repressive and non-manipulative perspective’, and of ‘non-
dominative and non-coercive knowledge’, is distinctly un-Foucauldian,
claiming that his argument is ‘deliberately anti-Foucault’ (1991 [1978]: 24,
1985: 15; Salusinszky 1987: 137). Even at its height, in Orientalism , Said’s
use of Foucault is remarkably thin.
And in his subsequent work, as well as in his parallel writings on US
imperialism and Middle East politics, this essentially modernist vein of Said’s
work is even more apparent. Chomsky’s work becomes a constant reference
point, with Said speaking with unstinting admiration for Chomsky’s
‘propaganda model’ of the American media (Herman and Chomsky 1988;
Said 1994c: 81), and for his dissections of American foreign policy and
Middle East politics (Said 1975, 1999b), and also claiming an inclination,
with Chomsky, for anarcho-syndicalism / even if this was only for its
interventions / 8:1
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