Moorecharacteristics.pdf

Moore,G.E.: 'Arethe Characteristics

ofThingsUniversal

Particufa(?,"

Proceedingsof the AristotelianSociety,Supp.vol.lll.

1923.

Reprinted

byCourtesyof theEditoroftheAristotelian

Society:1923.

www.aristotel

iansociety.

org.uk

IV. LESLIE MACKE}iZIE.

of the organism and its relation to the environment, f have no

objection to this relative use of the word; but I should prefer

" adaptation." Darwin assumed only variation and natural

selection, resulting in adaptation. The " results " are the same

as if they had been " intended." f do not seewhat new knorv-

ledge is added by calling the result " beleological."

9. Conclusion.-There are many other points to be discussed;

but I have taken too many words to discuss even these few. I

rvish, however, to say with Dr. Russell how highly the scientific

and philosophical rvorlds alipreciate Dr. Haldane's fine ph.ysio-

logical researches. In what I have said, I have spoken only as

a " consumer " of scientific ideas, anxious to get something clear

in my own mind for my personal use. I am not adequately

equipped to offer a real scientific criticism of Dr. Haldane's work

and that is why I have kept to general t6rms. But I should 1ike

to know from him whether, in his own imagination, he doesnot

contemplate some actual physical " mechanism," even for the

extraordinarily delicate businessof " physiological regulation."

Psychology and physiology, so far as the human being is

concerned,seemto me convergingsciences. They are the study

of two primary phases of a single organism, which we may

designate a psycho-physical unity. I am sorry that Dr. Haldane

sets aside physiological psychology; for under that or another

name, the organism must continue to be investigated from the

two'standpoipts. To call tho rvhole science" psychology', and

to expound all the phenomcna as " mental " does not in the least

alter the facts to be studied in the ordinary scientific rvorld,

namely, sensationsof vision, of hearing, of touch, of motement,

of organic processes,

V.-ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PASTICULAR

THINGS UNIVERSAL OR PARTICUI"AR ?

By G. E. Moonn,G.X'.Srour andG-DewnslLcrs.

I.-By G. E. Moonn.

of the British Acad,emy, Vol. X, L92L-22.) He

thereadvocatessomeview, which he seemsto think can be pro-

perly expressedby the words: " Every characterwhich char-

acterizeseither a concretething or a concreteindividual is par-

ticular and not universal." And I undersuandthat what we

are wanted to do is to discussthe view which Ze expressesby

thosewords. 'We arenot to give to the wordsthe senseor senses

whichwe may think they ought to bear, and then to discuss

whetherthe view or views they would thm expressis true or

false. What we haveto do is to try to discoverwhat Prof. Stout

means

which

by them, and then merely to discuss whether the view

ft.euses them to express is true or false.

may think that the view in question is one

properly expressedby them at all.

even though we

which cannot be

instincts, emotionsand all the other nrental

phenonrena shown through physical organs.

Now I confess that I thinl< it extremely difrcult to be sure

what Prof. Stout does mean by those words. All that I can do,

therefore, is to try to state as clearly as possible the only views

which, so far as I can see,he might mean by them, and to discusg

ivhether those are true or false. It is, of course, possible that I

may have overlookecl just the view which is what he really does

I ur.rounsreunthat the object of this Symposium is to discussa

view advocatedby Prof. Stout in his Hertz Lectureto the British

Academy on " The Nature of Universals and Propositions."

(Proceed,ings

G. E. MOORE.

ARE CHARACTDNISTICS UNIVERSAL ON PENIICUI,^I.N ?

mesn; but, if so, I hope that what I shall say will at least have

the use of making it easier for him to point out to us what he

doesmean.

There are two main points as to which I feel doubt. The

first is as to what precisely he means by the expression "'is par-

tieular " (ot " 'Ls a part'ictd,ar " ; for he sometimes uses this latter

expression also, as equivalent to the former, e.g., p. 8) in the

sent€nce,'i Every char-a,cterwhich characterizes a concrete thing

is partical,ar." And the seconcl is as to how, precisel/, he uses

the term " character,"

As regards the first point, I feel no doubt whatevet that part,

at lnast, of what he means by " is particular " is " char&cterizes

one thi:rg only." Part, at least, of what he means to assert

with regard to every entity of which it can be truly said that it

is " a character of a concrete thing," in the sense (whatever it

may be) in which he is using the term " character," is, quite

clearly, that every such entity charactnrizu on'e thing onl'y; or

(what is equivalent to this) that no such entity characterizes

more than one thing-no such entity is a " common chata,cter "

of two or more things. This notion, of characterizing one thing

only, seemsto me to be a perfectly clear conception ; and hence,

if only we can discover what Prof. Stout means by " characters,"

we shall have one perfectly clear proposition, which is certainly

part at least of what he meansto assert, and which we can discuss'

IlIy only doubt is as to whether " charact€tizes one thing only "

can be all, that he means by " is particular " or " is a particular."

But liere I have to conJessthat, il Prof. Stout does mean any-

thing else, I have not been able to form the faintest notion of

what else he does mean. I shall, therefore, have to content

myself with discussing, with regard to certain classesof entities,

whether it is or is not true of them that every such entity chnrqn-

tizes one thirw only, although I recognize that this is probably

onlv a part of what Prof. Stout means to assert.

ft seemsto me, I may explain, a wholly indefensiblemisuse

of language,to use the expressions " is particular " or " is a

particular" in sucha way that the proposition " P is particular "

or " P is a particular " implies " P characterizes onething only."

None of the various sensesin which " is particular " c&n be

properlyused seemsto me to carry with them this imFlication.

But I think there is no doubt that Prof. Stout is using them in

somesense which doescarry this implication; and.,as I have

said, I understandthat we are to discussonly views which he

doesmean,and not views which we ma,ythink his words ought

to mean.

But there is one meaningwhich might be attached to the

expressions

rvith thnt mer,,ning.In the formulation of our

questionthe phrase " particular things " is apparently usedas a

synonymfor the phrase " concretethings," which Prof. Stout

useson pp. 4 and 5 ; and Prof. Stout himselfsousesit at the top

of p. 5. And I think that undoubtedlyonecorrectusage of ,, is

particular " or " is a particular " is as a synonymfor " is a par-

ticular thing " or " isa concrete

thing." If Prof. Stout wereusing

the expressions

in this sense, his statement " Every character

thing is particular " would,of course,meanthe same

as " Every character of a concrete thing is itself a concrete

thing." Ancl it might perhapsbe thought that this is what he

doeg mean. But he certainly cannot consistentl,ymean this ;

since on p. 7 he declaresthat a sneeze certainly is " particular,"

while he impliesthat nevertheless

it is not a " substance

" beingonewhich he usesthroughout

fromp. 7 onwardsas equivalent to " is a concretething or indi-

vid.ual." He implies, therefore, that a sneeze,while it is

" particular," in the sense(whatever that may be) in which he

" is particul&r " or " is a particular," with regard

to which I think it is very important to point out that prof.

Stout cannot,consistently with sta,tementsof his own, be using

the expressions

of a concrete

"-the

expression

" is a substance

G, E. MOOR,E.

ARE CHARACTERISTICSUNMRSAL On penrtCUr,,ln

maintains that all " characters" of concretethings are " par-

ticular," is nol itself a " concletething." And in the samepass-

age he employsa useful mark for distinguishing " characters "

from " concretethings" or " concreteindivid.uals." Nothing,he

impliee, can be a " character," u.nlass

and flashesof lightning, are,f should

agreewith Mr. Johnson,what he calls " substantiv€sproper"-

a categorywhich exclude.q

it, is pred,ieableof somd,hing

else; and nothing can be a " concrete thing " or " concrete

individual " or " substance" if it is pred,i,cabln

their being " characters,"for the very

rea$on that no " substantiveproper" is pred-icableof anphing

else. But thoughall eventsare" substantives proper,"it appears

to me, as I gather it doesto Mr. Johnson, a mere misuse of

languageto call events, as Dr. McTaggart does, " ,substanc,es."

Whenhe asserted.

of somethingelse;

from which it would again follow that, accordingto him, no

charactercanbe " particular"'in the senseof beinga concrete

thing.

It seemsto me that the notion of beingpreilirnblnof somcthingelse

is a cleer one, and that it is undoubtedly in accordancewith

usageto confine the term " character " to what is predicable of

something else, and the terms " concrete thing," " concrete

intlividual " &nd " substence

on p. 7, that Mr. Johnsonsays that a flash of

lightuing is a substance, Prof. Stout must, I suppose,havebeen

assuming

that Mr. Johnson would usethe term " subst&nce" asa

synonymfor " substantiveproper" ; whereas,whileMr. Johuson

doeshold that a flash of lightning rs rwt a " ch&ract€r," he also

holdsthat it is not a " subst&nce,"since he recognizesa category

of entities which he calls " occurrences," which, though they

sharewith " subgtances

" to what is not. I should myself

be inclined to use the term " is a character " as equiaalnntto

" is predicableof something else" ; sothat not only would every

" character " be predicable of something else, but everything

that is predicableof anything glse would be & " character" : I

fully recognize,however, that it ia legitimate to use the term

" character " in a more restricted sense,so that someonly of the

entitieswhich are predicable of somethingelsewould be " char-

&cters." But that nothing can be properly called a " char&cter,"

unlpssit is predicable of somethingelse,f do agreewith Prof.

Stout; and that is why, by the way, I wholly dissentfrom his

proposition that a sneezer.s & " character." I may say of a

givenindividual A: " It was A that sneezed

" the characteristicthat they are not

predicableof anything, and are therefore not " characters,"

tlifier from " substances " in other repects.

To return from this digression. The only meaning which I

c&n seeProf. Stout to be attaching to the expreasions" is par-

ticular " or " is a particular " is the meaning" characterizesone

thing only," and hencethe only possible meaningsof his sentence

" Every characterof a concretething or a concreteindividual is

particular," which I can discuss,will be meanings obtained by

understanding" is particulat " in this sense.

But there remainsthe question: In whattsenseis he using

the term " character " ?

The sentence " Every character of a concrete thing char-

acterizesonething only," would, I think, be naturally understood

in a sensefrom which it would follow that, if A and B are two

difierent concretethings, then it cannot be true, e.g., both that

A is round, and that B is round; both that A is red.,and that B

is red, &c. This is what would be naturally implied by saying

that sneeze

" m&/r I think, expressa

" ch&ractnt,'i since they may expresssomething which is pre-

dicable of A. But that the sneezeitself is predicable of any

thing whatever,I wbolly deny. What we mean by " sneezed

that sneeze

" is twt the sameaswhat we meanby " that sneeze."

The sneezeitself is, I should say, quite "lo"Iy an euerd; and

everyeventis quitc asincapableof beingpredicatedof anything

else,as is a concretething or concreteindividual or substance.

All events,includingsneezes

" ; and

here the words " sneezedthat sneeze

I00

G. E. MOORE.

ARE CHARACTER,ISTICS UNIVE&SAL OR, PARTICULAIT ?

IOI

that two concretethings -neverhave a commoncharacter. But

thesepropositionsare obviouslymonstrouslyfalse,and.I think

it is quite plain that Prof. Stout doesnot mean to assertthat they

are true. He is obviously willing to allow that, where " A "

&nd" B" &renamesof two difierentconcretethings,the expres-

siong" A is round " and " B is round," may, nevertheless,each

of them expressa true proposition. But what, then, doeshe

meanby sayingthat, if A and,B aretwo difierentconcretethings,

aserycharacterwhich belongsto A belongsto A only, ancl every

characterwhich belongsto B to B only ?

So far as I can see,there are only two possiblealternatives

as to his meaning. (l) He might possiblybemeaningto saythat,

if, where " A " and." B " are namesof two different concrete

things, the expressions

A " A is red," would be "A is characterized by Rr," while what I

should mean by " is red," if I saidl ol B " B is red," lvould be

" B is characterized by Rr," and that, therefore, I should be

using " is red," in the two cases,in difierent senses. But, if

Prof. Stout does mean this, then I think .what he means is obvi-

ously false. If I merely tell somebody that one of my sense-data

is red, f am obviously not telling him rvhat particular shade of

red it is of. That is to say, I am twt using " is red " &s a name

for the particular shadewhich it, in fact, presents to me. Suppose

the shade in question is R1. I am not, as Prof. Stout seems to

imply, using " is red " as a name for Rr. And what I am using

it as a name for, is, I think, pretty obvious. I perceivewith regard.

to Rr, that it has a certain character, P, which belongs also to the

shade R, and to an immense number of other particular shades,

and what I mean by " is red," is simply " has somecharacter of

the kind P." And what I am telling anybody, if I telt him, with

regard to another sense-datum,B, which presentsto me the shade

Rr, that it also is red, is precisely thp samn thing, namely, that

B also " has some character of the kind P." It is true that how

I know, in the case supposed, that the sense-datum A. has sonrc

character of the kind P, and that the sense-datum B also has

somechatacter of the kind P, is becauseI know in the case of A

that it has R1, and that R1 has the character P, and in the case

of B that it has Rr, and that R2 has the character P. But is it

not obvious that this extra knowledge, which f, in fact. have

with regard to A and B, namely, that A has the shade R1, anclB

the shade R2, forms no part of what I enpressby " A is red "

or by " B is red " ? The opposite view that what f express by

" is ted " in the one case is " has R1," and in the other " has

R2," and is therefore somqthing difierent in the two cases,can, f

think, be refuted by a rednrcti,oad,'absurdumas follows. Suppose

R1 and R2 are not only shades of red, but also shadesof scarlet.

I can then truly use the rvords " A and B are both scarlet " as

; so that, while aclmitting

that what is predicatedof A in a true propositionexpressed.

" A is round. " *uy be exactlythe same as what is preclicatedof

B in a true proposition expressedby " B is rouncl," he would

maintain that what is, in suchcases,preilicatedof both, cannot

properlybe calleda " ch&racter."

As regarils (l) I think it is just possiblethat Prof. Stout does

meento say this, becawe,in a folmer publicationof his on the

samesubject(AristotelianProaul,ings,1914-15, p. 348), he has

said s6methingwhich seemsto imply it. " When I assert,"he

there says," that the sense-datum

is red, I meon just that par-

ticular red with w"hichI am immediately acquainted." Thig

ought to mean,I take it, that if f havetwo differentsense-data,

one of rvhich,A, presentsto me oneparticular shadeof red, R1,

while the other,B, presentsto me a tlifierentparticularshade,Rs,

then what I shouldmeanby the expression

" is red," if I saiil of

" A is round " and " B is round " both

expresstrue propositions,the sense in which " is round." is

used in the one mwt be il;iffermr from that in which it is used

in the other. Or (2) he may be using the term " character "

in a quite indefensiblyrestrictedsense

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika: