Woolf; Callicles and Socrates. Psychic (Dis)harmony in the Gorgias.pdf
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CALLICLES AND SOCRATES: PSYCHIC
(DIS)HARMONY IN THE
GORGIAS
RAPHAEL WOOLF
In this paper I want to o·er a new way of looking at Callicles’
position in Plato’s
Gorgias
, and at the conception of the good life
which Socrates presents in return. In particular I want to suggest
that these two positions, on the surface radically opposed, have a
certain deeper a¶nity. None the less, Callicles’ position contains
internal contradictions, as Socrates’ does not. This is connected
withthefactthatSocrates’positionischaracterizedbyhisadvocacy
of a theory of psychic harmony, central to which is the holding of
consistent beliefs. I shall develop my interpretation by exploring
theroleofthe Socraticmethodofelenchuswithin thedialogue,and
inparticular byassessingits failurewhen confrontedwith Callicles.
Callicles’conflicts,evidencinghisdisharmonioussoul,arethe‘hard
case’ which reveals the limits of Socratic method. I shall conclude
byconsideringhowthis lessonis subsequentlytakenupinthe early
booksof the
Republic
. The education proposed in books 2 and 3 of
that work, I shall suggest, both recognizes these limits and seeks
to supplement appropriately. Thus it is an attempt to vindicate
Socratic method, not supplant it.1
ã Raphael Woolf 2000
Thanks to Verity Harte and Richard Sorabji for comments on earlier drafts. A
version of this paper was presented to an audience at the University of Colorado
at Boulder, and I would like to thank Gabriela Carone and her graduate class for
their questions and comments. Some of the ideas herein were aired at the King’s
College London graduate seminar in Ancient Philosophy, spring 1998 (devoted to
the
Gorgias)
; thanks to all participants for much vigorous discussion. My thanks
above all to M. M. McCabe for nurturing an interest in the
Gorgias
from whichthis
paper grew.
1 My interpretation here may usefully be compared with that of Dominic Scott
(‘Platonic Pessimism and Moral Education’ [‘Platonic Pessimism’],
Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy
, 17 (1999), 15–36). Scott’s paper, like mine, sees the
Gorgias
(in particular Socrates’ encounter with Callicles) as presenting a crisis for Socratic
method, a crisis addressed by the educational apparatus of the
Republic
.Butwithin
2
Raphael Woolf
1. The two Callicles
At
Gorgias
482e, towards the beginningof hislong openingspeech
(482c–486d), Callicles makes the claim that nature (
φσις
)andlaw
or convention (
νµος
) are for the most part opposed to one another
, e 5–6). Socrates has other ideas. At 489b 2–4 he
makes a contrary assertion, that they are not opposed,basing him-
selfonCallicles’ owndefinition(subsequentlyaltered) ofthosewho
are ‘superior by nature’ as ‘the stronger’. Callicles, though, never
explicitly withdraws his claim (nor Socrates his opposition).I want
firstly to suggest that this is in fact a particularly appropriate po-
sition for Callicles to hold, since his opening speech (and much
of what he says thereafter) reveals him to be a man of contradic-
tions himself, and indeed an accurate reflection in a certain way of
the thoroughgoingopposition he sees between nature and conven-
tion. Callicles’ position, then, has contrary aspects, which I shall
representby the quasi-personallabels ‘Callicles 1’and ‘Callicles 2’.
One side of Callicles (we shall see)—Callicles 1—wants to shatter
and override law and convention. The other side—Callicles 2—
recommends working within law and convention as the framework
for a happy life.
Callicles’ openingspeech divides fairly naturally into two halves.
In its first half (482 c–484c) Callicles 1 is to the forefront.Callicles
says that it is just by nature for the superior to rule the inferior
(483d), adducing as an example of natural justice the behaviour
of the kings of Persia in their invasion of smaller countries.2 The
naturallyinferior—themajority—gettogethertomakelaws,impose
equality, and stop the naturally superior having a greater share,
which is their natural right (483 b–c).But an individualwith a suf-
ficientlystrongnaturecansmashsuchlaws (
ναντ λλλοις
καταπατσας . . . νµους
, 484a 4–5) and do whatever he likes—
Callicles cites the example of Hercules, who seized Geryon’s cattle
where convention would demand that you do not take what is not
yours unless it is freely given (484 b–c).
Here,then,isCallicles1.3 Butinthesecondhalfofthespeech,the
this broad outline our approaches are rather di·erent: I have tried to present some
criticisms of Scott’s interpretation in nn. 21, 34, and 44 below.
2 See n. 8 below.
3 There is, though, even within this section, a certain tension. Callicles speaks of
(
τος παρ φσιν παντας
Callicles and Socrates
3
rebuke to Socrates (484 c–486d), Callicles 2 is the leading player.
It now emerges that it is a great disadvantage to be unversed in
the laws and conventions of one’s city (
τν νµων πειροι . . . τν
κατ τν πλιν
, 484d 2–3)4 and, generally, in ‘human ways’ (
τν
, d 5–6).5 The ideal promulgated here
is that of being a ‘gentleman’ (
καλν κγαθν
) and a man of good
) (484d 1–2). Callicles 2 recommends that we be
thoroughlyversedinthe law, in publica·airs,and inbusiness(d 4),
sincethisiswhata·ordsus‘lifeandreputationandmanyothergood
things’ (486d 1). On this picture one makes it one’s aim to heed,
not to smash, law and custom.
Thislatter ideal is contrastedby Callicles with the lifeof the phi-
losopheraspractisedbySocrates.Nownotethatthephilosopher,as
portrayedbyCallicles, hassomea¶nitywith thesmasheroflaws of
484a, in attitude towards law and convention. Both would regard
the man of conventional good repute praised by Callicles 2 with
a certain contempt. Both seek a life outside ‘the system’, whereas
the whole approach of Callicles 2 is based on operating within the
system. Callicles 1 seeks to destroy its institutions, the philosopher
to live his life so as to have as little to do with them as possible.The
latter therefore (according to Callicles) avoids the city centres and
spends his life ‘whispering in a corner’ with boys, destined to live
‘without honour’(
εδκιµον
) in his city (485d, 486c).
One way in which to characterize the di·erence between Calli-
cles 1 and Callicles 2 is perhaps in terms of their need for other
people, in particular for other people’s good opinion. A main aim
of Callicles 2, as we have seen, is the winning and maintaining
τιµον
helping those whom one cares for (cf. 483 b 4), and later on in the dialogue talks of
the ruler giving more to his friends than his enemies (492 c 2–3). Presumably these
people one cares for belong to the inferior lot (otherwise they would not have to
be
helped
by Callicles). But it is not supposed to be right for such people to have
a larger share than others, on Callicles’ own account, given their inferiority. That
is the preserve of the superior. Callicles’ o¶cial doctrine of what is right leaves no
room for the privileging of any of the inferior people.
4 Contrast thislanguage withthewayCalliclespouredscorn onGorgiasandPolus
for having been obeisant to human convention (
τ θος τν νθρπων
)at482d.
5 This seems a more appropriate translation than the possible, but narrower,
‘human characters’, since the phrase is used by Callicles to
sum up
(cf.
συλλβδην
,
484 d 6) the things which one should not be inexperienced in, and they include
(d 2–6): laws and conventions, ways of conducting various human transactions,
human pleasures and desires—in other words, for Callicles, the range of practices
and preferences one finds in human society.
νθρωπεων . . . τν θν
repute (
4
Raphael Woolf
of a good reputation among his fellow citizens. The usurper, by
contrast, is unmoved by such considerations, since it is precisely
in defiance of conventional opinion that he acts.6 Both the usurper
and the philosopher, then, are uninfluenced by what others think
of them, and so each in his di·erent way is a person who aims at
integrity, seeking self-realization without the constraint of anyone
else’s rules.
Now I have spoken of there being a Callicles of contradictions
here. It may be thought unreasonable to make this strong claim—
that what we have is essentially a ‘split personality’ with conflicting
principles ofhowlife is to be led. I argue, however, thatmy reading
is licensed by the substance of Callicles’ speech, which we have
been examining, and that any temptation to read it more weakly
is to be resisted once we look at some of Socrates’ remarks in his
immediately preceding speech (481 c–482c). The subject of these
remarks is internal contradiction, and in particular Callicles’ own
proneness to it. Socrates notes that when one is in love one will
agree with whatever one’s beloved says, so that if, as in the case of
Callicles, one’s beloved is constantly changing his opinion, so will
the lover, so that from one momentto the next one is contradicting
6 Ithink Terence Irwin
(Plato,Gorgias
[
Gorgias
] (Oxford, 1979), 179) is onlyhalf
right when he says: ‘Plato suggests that Callicles cannot maintain his self-respect;
his chosen way of achieving his goals makes him depend on the public opinion of
the masses he despises.’ Similarly Charles Kahn (‘Drama and Dialectic in Plato’s
Gorgias
’ [‘Drama and Dialectic’],
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
, 1 (1983),
75–121 at 100) sees an ‘underlying conflict between Callicles’elitist convictions and
his popular aspirations’, but regards the gratification of popular taste as merely
instrumental for Callicles in the achievement of power (98) (though Kahn does see
Polus
as embodying a stark contradiction between what Kahn calls ‘heroic’ and
‘civic’ values, 95–6). I agree that there is the kind of tension in Callicles’ position
which these authors describe. But I find (and these authors supply) no evidence
that Callicles sees ingratiation with popular convention as the
means
by which he
will reach his stated aim of overthrowing such convention. Taken at face value,
Callicles’ speech as a whole is not the setting out of the steps of a ‘master plan’,
but an expression of two separate ideals which he does not try to make cohere, and
whichin hisversion of them radically conflict. Areading of Calliclesrather closer to
mine is that of Arlene Saxonhouse, ‘An Unspoken Theme in Plato’s
Gorgias
:War’,
Interpretation
, 11(1983), 139–69at 162. Thoughherpaper hasasomewhat di·erent
orientation, she in my view quite rightly sees Callicles’ speech as setting out two
alternative visions, ‘on the one hand the superman . . . on the other the political
man’. See also Seth Benardete,
The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy
(Chicago,
1991), 64, who calls the two parts of Callicles’speech ‘not quite consistent with one
another’ and explainsthat ‘[Callicles]uses philosophyto mountan attack onthe city
in the first part and in the second part attacks philosophy in the name of the city’,
though the sense in which Benardete takes Callicles to be ‘using philosophy’ in the
first part of his speech (by presenting a theory?) is not made clear.
Callicles and Socrates
5
oneself(481 d ·.). Socrates further suggests that if Callicles cannot
refute him, then in asserting a thesis contrary to his, ‘Callicles will
not agree with you, Callicles’ (482 b 5–6).7 Socrates goes on to state
in general terms his own aversion to being internally discordant
and speaking things that are contradictory to his own self (482b–
c). Socratesconcludeshisspeechwith theseobservations,andtheir
e·ect is surely to put us as readers on the alert. We have been
primed to go through Callicles’ speech with the likelihood of his
self-contradiction at the forefront of our minds, so that if the text
seems to reveal an inconsistent position on his part, we have been
given a large authorial hint to accept it as such.
Let us sum up Callicles’ conflicts. Callicles 1 is a would-be
smasher of law and convention, an individual acting by his own
lights (note the emphatic singularity of
χων νρ
at 484a 3)8,con-
temptuous of other people’s opinion. Callicles 2 rides with the law
and conventional principle, and good reputation is highly impor-
tant to him. I propose to relate this opposition within Callicles to
the opposition between
νµος
and
φσις
,and
then, on the other hand,goeson to commenda way oflife in which
immersion in
φσις
over
νµος
plays a central role. I suggest, then, that part
of the reason why this terminology is here is that it signifies two
kinds of human aim or aspiration, and raises the question, via the
figure of Callicles (and later of Socrates), of whether their mutual
satisfaction is possible. Callicles 2 is the embodiment of
—the
man ofconventionandofconventionalsociety, whose ideal is social
approval accordingto conventionalnorms. Callicles 1, on the other
hand, stands for the ‘law of nature’ (483 e 3), in opposition to the
constraints ofcivic society (e 3–6).He representsthe essence ofthe
individual seeking self-realization, a life of complete integrity, free
from social restraint and having no need of social approval.
Thus far,
νµος
and
φσις
have been presented as mutually op-
νµος
7 This way of speaking of Callicles, as if he were two people, licenses in principle
my speaking of ‘Callicles 1’ and ‘Callicles 2’.
8 For anappreciation of how individualisticCallicles1is, note too that his would-
beexamples ofthe exerciseof natural justiceby
states
isactually spelt outinterms of
individual rulers of states—Xerxes and Xerxes’ father (483 d 6–7), kings of Persia.
Their conquests are described collectively: Greece and the Scythians respectively
(d 7).
which we have seen Calli-
cles state at 482 e. There seems good reason to do this. After all,
Callicles explicitlyconnectsthis pieceof theorizingto hisownethi-
cal view basedon the normative supremacyof
νµος
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