Descartes, Rene - Meditations of First Philosophy.pdf

(103 KB) Pobierz
Meditations of First Philosophy
Meditations of First Philosophy
Descartes
Meditations of First Philosophy
Table of Contents
Meditations of First Philosophy. ........................................................................................................................1
Descartes. .................................................................................................................................................1
Dedication. ...............................................................................................................................................1
Preface to the Reader. ..............................................................................................................................3
Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations.. ..........................................................................................5
Meditation .. ............................................................................................................................................6
Meditation II. ...........................................................................................................................................9
Meditation III. ........................................................................................................................................13
Meditation IV. ........................................................................................................................................21
Meditation V. .........................................................................................................................................25
Meditation VI. ........................................................................................................................................29
i
19689171.001.png
Meditations of First Philosophy
Descartes
This page copyright © 2002 Blackmask Online.
http://www.blackmask.com
·
·
·
Dedication
To the Most Wise and Illustrious the Dean and Doctors of the Sacred Faculty of Theology in Paris.
The motive which induces me to present to you this Treatise is so excellent, and, when you become
acquainted with its design, I am convinced that you will also have so excellent a motive for taking it under
your protection, that I feel that I cannot do better, in order to render it in some sort acceptable to you, than in
a few words to state what I have set myself to do.
I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that
ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than theological argument. For although it is quite enough
for us faithful ones to accept by means of faith the fact that the human soul does not perish with the body, and
that God exists, it certainly does not seem possible ever to persuade infidels of any religion, indeed, we may
almost say, of any moral virtue, unless, to begin with, we prove these two facts by means of the natural
reason. And inasmuch as often in this life greater rewards are offered for vice than for virtue, few people
would prefer the right to the useful, were they restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of
another life; and although it is absolutely true that we must believe that there is a God, because we are so
taught in the Holy Scriptures, and, on the other hand, that we must believe the Holy Scriptures because they
come from God (the reason of this is, that, faith being a gift of God, He who gives the grace to cause us to
believe other things can likewise give it to cause us to believe that He exists), we nevertheless could not place
this argument before infidels, who might accuse us of reasoning in a circle. And, in truth, I have noticed that
you, along with all the theologians, did not only affirm that the existence of God may be proved by the
natural reason, but also that it may be inferred from the Holy Scriptures, that knowledge about Him is much
clearer than that which we have of many created things, and, as a matter of fact, is so easy to acquire, that
those who have it not are culpable in their ignorance. This indeed appears from the Wisdom of Solomon,
chapter xiii., where it is said Howbeit they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that
they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof? and in
Romans, chapter i., it is said that they are without excuse ; and again in the same place, by these words that
which may be known of God is manifest in them, it seems as through we were shown that all that which can
be known of God may be made manifest by means which are not derived from anywhere but from ourselves,
Meditations of First Philosophy
1
·
·
19689171.002.png
Meditations of First Philosophy
and from the simple consideration of the nature of our minds. Hence I thought it not beside my purpose to
inquire how this is so, and how God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the world.
And as regards the soul, although many have considered that it is not easy to know its nature, and some have
even dared to say that human reasons have convinced us that it would perish with the body, and that faith
alone could believe the contrary, nevertheless, inasmuch as the Lateran Council held under Leo X (in the
eighth session) condemns these tenets, and as Leo expressly ordains Christian philosophers to refute their
arguments and to employ all their powers in making known the truth, I have ventured in this treatise to
undertake the same task.
More than that, I am aware that the principal reason which causes many impious persons not to desire to
believe that there is a God, and that the human soul is distinct from the body, is that they declare that hitherto
no one has been able to demonstrate these two facts; and although I am not of their opinion but, on the
contrary, hold that the greater part of the reasons which have been brought forward concerning these two
questions by so many great men are, when they are rightly understood, equal to so many demonstrations, and
that it is almost impossible to invent new ones, it is yet in my opinion the case that nothing more useful can
be accomplished in philosophy than once for all to seek with care for the best of these reasons, and to set
them forth in so clear and exact a manner, that it will henceforth be evident to everybody that they are
veritable demonstrations. And, finally, inasmuch as it was desired that I should undertake this task by many
who were aware that I had cultivated a certain Method for the resolution of difficulties of every kind in the
Sciencesa method which it is true is not novel, since there is nothing more ancient than the truth, but of
which they were aware that I had made use successfully enough in other matters of difficultyI have thought
that it was my duty also to make trial of it in the present matter.
Now all that I could accomplish in the matter is contained in this Treatise. Not that I have here drawn
together all the different reasons which might be brought forward to serve as proofs of this subject: for that
never seemed to be necessary excepting when there was no one single proof that was certain. But I have
treated the first and principal ones in such a manner that I can venture to bring them forward as very evident
and very certain demonstrations. And more than that, I will say that these proofs are such that I do not think
that there is any way open to the human mind by which it can ever succeed in discovering better. For the
importance of the subject, and the glory of God to which all this relates, constrain me to speak here somewhat
more freely of myself than is my habit. Nevertheless, whatever certainty and evidence I find in my reasons, I
cannot persuade myself that all the world is capable of understanding them. Still, just as in Geometry there
are many demonstrations that have been left to us by Archimedes, by Apollonius, by Pappus, and others,
which are accepted by everyone as perfectly certain and evident (because they clearly contain nothing which,
considered by itself, is not very easy to understand, and as all through that which follows has an exact
connection with, and dependence on that which precedes), nevertheless, because they are somewhat lengthy,
and demand a mind wholly devoted tot heir consideration, they are only taken in and understood by a very
limited number of persons. Similarly, although I judge that those of which I here make use are equal to, or
even surpass in certainty and evidence, the demonstrations of Geometry, I yet apprehend that they cannot be
adequately understood by many, both because they are also a little lengthy and dependent the one on the
other, and principally because they demand a mind wholly free of prejudices, and one which can be easily
detached from the affairs of the senses. And, truth to say, there are not so many in the world who are fitted for
metaphysical speculations as there are for those of Geometry. And more than that; there is still this
difference, that in Geometry, since each one is persuaded that nothing must be advanced of which there is not
a certain demonstration, those who are not entirely adepts more frequently err in approving what is false, in
order to give the impression that they understand it, than in refuting the true. But the case is different in
philosophy where everyone believes that all is problematical, and few give themselves to the search after
truth; and the greater number, in their desire to acquire a reputation for boldness of thought, arrogantly
combat the most important of truths.
Meditations of First Philosophy
2
Meditations of First Philosophy
That is why, whatever force there may be in my reasonings, seeing they belong to philosophy, I cannot hope
that they will have much effect on the minds of men, unless you extend to them your protection. But the
estimation in which you Company is universally held is so great, and the name of Sorbonne carries with it so
much authority, that, next to the Sacred Councils, never has such deference been paid to the judgment of any
Body, not only in what concerns the faith, but also in what regards human philosophy as well: everyone
indeed believes that it is not possible to discover elsewhere more perspicacity and solidity, or more integrity
and wisdom in pronouncing judgment. For this reason I have no doubt that if you deign to take the trouble in
the first place of correcting this work (for being conscious not only of my infirmity, but also of my ignorance,
I should not dare to state that it was free from errors), and then, after adding to it these things that are lacking
to it, completing those which are imperfect, and yourselves taking the trouble to give a more ample
explanation of those things which have need of it, or at least making me aware of the defects so that I may
apply myself to remedy them when this is done and when finally the reasonings by which I prove that there
is a God, and that the human soul differs from the body, shall be carried to that point of perspicuity to which I
am sure they can be carried in order that they may be esteemed as perfectly exact demonstrations, if you
deign to authorize your approbation and to render public testimony to their truth and certainty, I do not doubt,
I say, that henceforward all the errors and false opinions which have ever existed regarding these two
questions will soon be effaced from the minds of men. For the truth itself will easily cause all men of mind
and learning to subscribe to your judgment; and your authority will cause the atheists, who are usually more
arrogant than learned or judicious, to rid themselves of their spirit of contradiction or lead them possibly
themselves to defend the reasonings which they find being received as demonstrations by all persons of
consideration, lest they appear not to understand them. And, finally, all others will easily yield to such a mass
of evidence, and there will be none who dares to doubt the existence of God and the real and true distinction
between the human soul and the body. It is for you now in your singular wisdom to judge of the importance
of the establishment of such beliefs [you who see the disorders produced by the doubt of them] . But it would
not become me to say more in consideration of the cause of God and religion to those who have always been
the most worthy supports of the Catholic Church.
Preface to the Reader
I have already slightly touched on these two questions of God and the human soul in the Discourse on the
Method of rightly conducting the Reason and seeking truth in the Sciences, published in French in the year
1637. Not that I had the design of treating these with any thoroughness, but only so to speak in passing, and
in order to ascertain by the judgment of the readers how I should treat them later on. For these questions have
always appeared to me to be of such importance that I judged it suitable to speak of them more than once; and
the road which I follow in the explanation of them is so little trodden, and so far removed from the ordinary
path, that I did not judge it to be expedient to set it forth at length in French and in a Discourse which might
be read by everyone, in case the feebler minds should believe that it was permitted to them to attempt to
follow the same path.
But, having in this Discourse on Method begged all those who have found in my writings somewhat
deserving of censure to do me the favour of acquainting me with the grounds of it, nothing worthy of remark
has been objected to in them beyond two matters: to these two I wish here to reply in a few words before
undertaking their more detailed discussion.
The first objection is that it does not follow from the fact that the human mind reflecting on itself does not
perceive itself to be other than a thing that thinks, that its nature or its essence consists only in its being a
thing that thinks, in the sense that this word only excludes all other things which might also be supposed to
pertain to the nature of the soul. To this objection I reply that it was not my intention in that place to exclude
these in accordance with the order that looks to the truth of the matter (as to which I was not then dealing),
but only in accordance with the order of my thought [perception]; thus my meaning was that so far as I was
aware, I knew nothing clearly as belonging to my essence, excepting that I was a thing that thinks, or a thing
Preface to the Reader
3

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika:

Zgłoś jeśli naruszono regulamin