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Crito
By Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Persons of the Dialogue
SOCRATES
CRITO
Scene
The Prison of Socrates.
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Socrates. WHY have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite
early.
Crito. Yes, certainly.
Soc. What is the exact time?
Cr. The dawn is breaking.
Soc. I wonder the keeper of the prison would let you in.
Cr. He knows me because I often come, Socrates; moreover. I have done
him a kindness.
Soc. And are you only just come?
Cr. No, I came some time ago.
Soc. Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of awakening me
at once?
Cr. Why, indeed, Socrates, I myself would rather not have all this
sleeplessness and sorrow. But I have been wondering at your peaceful
slumbers, and that was the reason why I did not awaken you, because
I wanted you to be out of pain. I have always thought you happy in
the calmness of your temperament; but never did I see the like of
the easy, cheerful way in which you bear this calamity.
Soc. Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought not to be
repining at the prospect of death.
Cr. And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes,
and age does not prevent them from repining.
Soc. That may be. But you have not told me why you come at this early
hour.
Cr. I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful; not, as
I believe, to yourself but to all of us who are your friends, and
saddest of all to me.
Soc. What! I suppose that the ship has come from Delos, on the arrival
of which I am to die?
Cr. No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be
here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they
have left her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the
last day of your life.
Soc. Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but
my belief is that there will be a delay of a day.
Cr. Why do you say this?
Soc. I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of
the ship?
Cr. Yes; that is what the authorities say.
Soc. But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow;
this I gather from a vision which I had last night, or rather only
just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.
Cr. And what was the nature of the vision?
Soc. There came to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely, clothed
in white raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates-
"The third day hence, to Phthia shalt thou go."
Cr. What a singular dream, Socrates!
Soc. There can be no doubt about the meaning Crito, I think.
Cr. Yes: the meaning is only too clear. But, O! my beloved Socrates,
let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if
you die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced,
but there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will
believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give
money, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace
than this- that I should be thought to value money more than the life
of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I wanted you
to escape, and that you refused.
Soc. But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the
many? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering,
will think of these things truly as they happened.
Cr. But do you see. Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be
regarded, as is evident in your own case, because they can do the
very greatest evil to anyone who has lost their good opinion?
Soc. I only wish, Crito, that they could; for then they could also
do the greatest good, and that would be well. But the truth is, that
they can do neither good nor evil: they cannot make a man wise or
make him foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance.
Cr. Well, I will not dispute about that; but please to tell me, Socrates,
whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends:
are you not afraid that if you escape hence we may get into trouble
with the informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the
whole or a great part of our property; or that even a worse evil may
happen to us? Now, if this is your fear, be at ease; for in order
to save you, we ought surely to run this or even a greater risk; be
persuaded, then, and do as I say.
Soc. Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means
the only one.
Cr. Fear not. There are persons who at no great cost are willing to
save you and bring you out of prison; and as for the informers, you
may observe that they are far from being exorbitant in their demands;
a little money will satisfy them. My means, which, as I am sure, are
ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple about spending
all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of theirs;
and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a sum of money for
this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are willing to spend
their money too. I say, therefore, do not on that account hesitate
about making your escape, and do not say, as you did in the court,
that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself
if you escape. For men will love you in other places to which you
may go, and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly,
if you like to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no
Thessalian will give you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are
justified, Socrates, in betraying your own life when you might be
saved; this is playing into the hands of your enemies and destroyers;
and moreover I should say that you were betraying your children; for
you might bring them up and educate them; instead of which you go
away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and
if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be
small thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world who
is unwilling to persevere to the end in their nurture and education.
But you are choosing the easier part, as I think, not the better and
manlier, which would rather have become one who professes virtue in
all his actions, like yourself. And, indeed, I am ashamed not only
of you, but of us who are your friends, when I reflect that this entire
business of yours will be attributed to our want of courage. The trial
need never have come on, or might have been brought to another issue;
and the end of all, which is the crowning absurdity, will seem to
have been permitted by us, through cowardice and baseness, who might
have saved you, as you might have saved yourself, if we had been good
for anything (for there was no difficulty in escaping); and we did
not see how disgraceful, Socrates, and also miserable all this will
be to us as well as to you. Make your mind up then, or rather have
your mind already made up, for the time of deliberation is over, and
there is only one thing to be done, which must be done, if at all,
this very night, and which any delay will render all but impossible;
I beseech you therefore, Socrates, to be persuaded by me, and to do
as I say.
Soc. Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if wrong,
the greater the zeal the greater the evil; and therefore we ought
to consider whether these things shall be done or not. For I am and
always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason,
whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to
be the best; and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot
put away the reasons which I have before given: the principles which
I have hitherto honored and revered I still honor, and unless we can
find other and better principles on the instant, I am certain not
to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude could
inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening
us like children with hobgoblin terrors. But what will be the fairest
way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old argument
about the opinions of men, some of which are to be regarded, and others,
as we were saying, are not to be regarded? Now were we right in maintaining
this before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good
now proved to be talk for the sake of talking; in fact an amusement
only, and altogether vanity? That is what I want to consider with
your help, Crito: whether, under my present circumstances, the argument
appears to be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by
me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe, is maintained
by many who assume to be authorities, was to the effect, as I was
saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other
men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are a disinterested person
who are not going to die to-morrow- at least, there is no human probability
of this, and you are therefore not liable to be deceived by the circumstances
in which you are placed. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying
that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued,
and other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued.
I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?
Cr. Certainly.
Soc. The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?
Cr. Yes.
Soc. And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the
unwise are evil?
Cr. Certainly.
Soc. And what was said about another matter? Was the disciple in gymnastics
supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man,
or of one man only- his physician or trainer, whoever that was?
Cr. Of one man only.
Soc. And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that
one only, and not of the many?
Cr. That is clear.
Soc. And he ought to live and train, and eat and drink in the way
which seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather
than according to the opinion of all other men put together?
Cr. True.
Soc. And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of
the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding,
will he not suffer evil?
Cr. Certainly he will.
Soc. And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affcting,
in the disobedient person?
Cr. Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the
evil.
Soc. Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which
we need not separately enumerate? In the matter of just and unjust,
fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present
consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear
them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding, and whom
we ought to fear and reverence more than all the rest of the world:
and whom deserting we shall destroy and injure that principle in us
which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by
injustice; is there not such a principle?
Cr. Certainly there is, Socrates.
Soc. Take a parallel instance; if, acting under the advice of men
who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improvable by
health and deteriorated by disease- when that has been destroyed,
I say, would life be worth having? And that is- the body?
Cr. Yes.
Soc. Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?
Cr. Certainly not.
Soc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be
depraved, which is improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice?
Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has
to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?
Cr. Certainly not.
Soc. More honored, then?
Cr. Far more honored.
Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us:
but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust,
will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in
error when you suggest that we should regard the opinion of the many
about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable.
Well, someone will say, "But the many can kill us."
Cr. Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.
Soc. That is true; but still I find with surprise that the old argument
is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should like to know Whether
I may say the same of another proposition- that not life, but a good
life, is to be chiefly valued?
Cr. Yes, that also remains.
Soc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one- that
holds also?
Cr. Yes, that holds.
Soc. From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I
ought or ought not to try to escape without the consent of the Athenians:
and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the attempt;
but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention,
of money and loss of character, and the duty of educating children,
are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as
ready to call people to life, if they were able, as they are to put
them to death- and with as little reason. But now, since the argument
has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be considered
is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering
others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks, or
whether we shan not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any
other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed
to enter into the calculation.
Cr. I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?
Soc. Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute
me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend,
from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of
the Athenians: for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you,
but not against my own better judgment. And now please to consider
my first position, and do your best to answer me.
Cr. I will do my best.
Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or
that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong,

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