Mao Tse Tung - On Guerilla Warfare.pdf - Strategia - materiały po ang - kyclawok

ON GUERILLA WARFARE

by: Mao Tse Tung

Written by Mao in 1937, when Japanese imperialists occupied all of China, this book served

as an instruction manual for guerrilla fighting, written based on more than a decade of

personal experience by Mao. Based on the basic strategy and tactics of warfare as described

by Sun-tzu, Mao stresses the importance of guerrilla warfare tactics in a revolutionary war,

emphasizing that they must be combined in conjunction with conventional warfare tactics.

1. What Is Guerrilla Warfare?

In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is

particularly true in war waged for the emancipation of a people who inhabit a vast nation.

China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose

communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese

imperialism. Under these circumstances, the development of the type of guerrilla warfare

characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be

developed to an unprecedented degree and it must co-ordinate with the operations of our

regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.

These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They

are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the

inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the

limits of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were

unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in People and

Revolution,[A] said: 'A people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but

inevitable.' We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war

because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a

solution to the struggle.

Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation

inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.

When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory

in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and

society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who

oppose him. In guerrilla warfare we turn these advantages to the purpose of resisting and

defeating the enemy.

During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate

in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those

guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of

development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be

no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.

Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain

distinctive characteristics. We first will discuss the relationship of guerrilla warfare to national

policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semi colonial country against an imperialism, our

hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political

responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This

policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the

Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this

policy, to wit:

1. Arousing and organizing the people.

2. Achieving internal unification politically.

3. Establishing bases.

4. Equipping forces.

5. Recovering national strength.

6. Destroying enemy's national strength.

7. Regaining lost territories.

There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the

contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord with national anti-Japanese

policy. It is only who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The

question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who

maintain this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of

guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and will

result in our defeat.

What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla

warfare must fail, as it must, if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the

people and their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of

guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counter-

revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because g uerrilla warfare

basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if

it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation. There are those who do not

comprehend guerrilla action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities

of a people's guerrilla war, who say: 'Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla operations.'

There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerilla action,

mistakenly say: 'Guerrilla warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized typ e of operation in

which there is no place for the masses of the people' (Jen Ch'i Shan). Then there are those

who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no

understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ch'ing, for one). The moment that this war of

resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it

dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.

What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that spring from the

masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the time of their formation, they all

have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have

political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units.

Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they may be formed from an

admixture of regular troops with groups of the people, or they may consist of regular army

units intact. And mere quantity does not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad

of a few men, a battalion of several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.

All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies—resolute, loyal, sincere, and

robust. These men must be well-educated in revolutionary technique, self confident, able to

establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda. In short, these leaders

must be models for the people. As the war progresses, such leaders lack of discipline which at

first will gradually overcome the lack of discipline which at first prevails; they will establish

discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency. Thus

eventual victory will be attained.

Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement

as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action.

They say, 'This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds, and bandits'

(Jen Ch'i Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there

are corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in

unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present time symptoms

of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla

warfare solely by the corrupt and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study

the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerilla warfare,

and to increase its military efficiency. 'This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem

cannot be solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the

cours e of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience.

Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities

that are anarchism,' said Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare.[B]

What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness,

mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of

communication, the relative strengths, the weather and the situation of the people.

In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the

west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a

lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he

advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he

withdraws. In guerilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his

vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated.

Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and

coordination with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most complete

preparation, there can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerilla

warfare based on the principles we have mentioned and carried out over a vast extent of

territory in which communications are inconvenient will contribute tremendously towards

ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.

A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerrilla warfare. The fact that

revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based o n the masses of the people does not in itself mean

that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a war of counter-revolutionary character.

As examples of the former type we may cite Red guerilla hostilities during the Russian

Revolution; those of the Reds China; of the Abyssinians against the Italians for the past three

years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese guerrilla war

that is carried on in China today. All these struggles have been carried on in the interest of the

whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower and

all have been in accord with the laws of historical development. They have existed and will

continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they are not contrary to national policy.

The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical development. Of

this type, we may cite the examples furnished by the White Russian guerrilla units organized

by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in

Abyssinia; those supported by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and those

that will be organized here by Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses and have

been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be firmly opposed. They are easy

to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people.

If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities mentioned, it is likely that

we wi ll exaggerate their effect when applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion

that 'the invader can organize guerrilla units from among the people'. Such a conclusion might

well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned, we have

but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.

Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely 'class' type. In

the former case, the whole people of a nation, without regard to class or party, carry on a

guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national policy. Its basis is, therefore, much

broader than is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been

said: 'When a nation is invaded, the people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in

organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent guerrillas are developed, they

do not produce the same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners'

(Civil War in Russia). The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality

of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps fight with great effect, whereas

in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal unification

of different class groups. This necessitates the use of propaga nda. Both types of guerrilla war

are, however, similar in that they both employ the same military methods.

National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying

implements as times, peoples, and conditions differ. The guerrilla aspects of the Opium War,

those of the fighting in Manchuria since the Mukden incident, and those employed in China

today are all slightly different. The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Moroccans against the

French and the Spanish was not exactly similar to that which we conduct today in China.

These differences express the characteristics of different peoples in different periods.

Although there is a general similarity in the quality of all these struggles, there are

dissimilarities in form. This fact we must recognize. Clausewitz wrote, in On War: 'Wars in

every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every

period must have its independent theory of war.' Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare said: 'As

regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionally requisite that history be investigated in order

to discover the co nditions of environment, the state of economic progress and the political

ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization.' Again: 'It

is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules and to study with

sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting, for these will change in accordance with the

political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These

progressive changes in conditions create new methods.'

If, in today's struggle, we fail to apply the historical truths of revolutionary guerrilla war, we will

fall into the error of believing with T'ou Hsi Sheng that under the impact of Japan's

mechanized army, 'the guerrilla unit has lost its historical function'. Jen Ch'i Shan writes: 'In

olden days guerrilla warfare was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it

can be applied today.' These opinions are harmful. If we do not make an estimate of the

characteristics peculiar to our anti-Japanese guerrilla war, but insist on applying to it

mechanical formulas derived from past history, we are making the mistake of placing our

hostilities in the same category as all other national guerrilla struggles. If we hold this view, we

will simply be beating our heads against a stone wall and we will be unable to profit from

guerrilla hostilities.

To summarize: What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan? It is one aspect of the

entire war, which, although alone incapable of producing the decision, attacks the enemy in

every quarter, diminishes the exte nt of area under his control, increases our national strength,

and assists our regular armies. It is one of the strategic instruments used to inflict defeat on

our enemy. It is the one pure expression of anti-Japanese policy, that is to say, it is military

strength organized by the active people and inseparable from them. It is a powerful special

weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.

2. The Relation Of Guerrilla Hostilitiesto Regular Operations

The general features of orthodox hostilities, that is, the war of position and the war of

movement, differ fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There are other readily apparent

differences such as those in organization, armament, equipment supply, tactics, command; in

conception of the terms 'front' and 'rear'; in the matter of military responsibilities.

When considered from the point of view of total numbers, guerrilla units are many, as

individual combat units, they may vary in size from the smallest, of several score or several

hundred men, to the battalion or the regiment, of several thousand. This is not the case in

regularly organized units. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon

the people themselves to organize battalions and other units. As a result of this, organization

depends largely upon local circumstances. In the case of guerrilla groups, the standard of

equipment is of a low order and they must depend for their sustenance primarily upon what

the locality affords.

The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox operations, as

the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement. There is in guerrilla warfare

no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defence

that characterizes orthodox war. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation

into a positional defensive situation never arises. The general features of reconnaissance,

Mao Tse Tung - On Guerilla Warfare.pdf

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika: