Zizek Lacans Use of mathematical science.pdf

Jason Glynos & Yannis Stavrakakis

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JASON GLYNOS &

YANNIS STAVRAKAKIS

Postures and Impostures: On Lacan’s Style

and Use of Mathematical Science

Introduction

Lacan makes difficult reading. No doubt about it. This, at

least, is common ground to sympathizers and detractors of

Lacan alike. Clearly, it is an understatement to say that when

mathematical science is added to the equation, things do not

become any easier. Most of us already feel insecure with the

simplest of mathematical statements, let alone references to

esoteric-sounding subdisciplines such as general topology or

knot theory.

When we inquire into the make-up of the universe, all the

way from distant galaxies and supernovae to cells, synapses,

and quarks, we are not surprised when confronted with a

discourse that sounds foreign to us. Scientific discourse is, by

and large, opaque and filled with impenetrable jargon that

takes considerable time and will to master. People do not

expect to understand quantum mechanics and are happy to

concede ignorance. On the other hand, when we inquire into

human nature, psychic processes, identities and emotions, and

the workings of the mind, we expect the corresponding

models and discourse to be easily understood. This is because

they are supposed to be telling us something about ourselves—

something, in other words, over which we each can claim some

authority and knowledge. It is a natural expectation that is

deeply ingrained. So much so that scientists themselves ex-

press frustration at the mind’s reluctance to yield its secrets. So

when Lacanian psychoanalysis—which purports to be such a

discourse about ourselves—appears to make every effort to

thwart straightforward understanding, when Lacan hesitates

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not a jot in enlisting mathematical science to his cause, this

cannot but seem to add insult to injury.

No one likes to feel stupid. A very rare person indeed is

she who, having struggled to make sense of Lacan’s Écrits , has

not entertained such thoughts of vulnerability. This vulnerabil-

ity is only exacerbated if a Lacanian seminar or essay has been

recommended as reading material by a friend or professor

whom we respect. It is a vulnerability that can very quickly turn

to frustration, intimidation, and even anger.

Just imagine, then, what would happen if someone came

along and declared Lacan to be an impostor. Let us assume,

futher, that this “someone” is a well-respected scientist, no less.

Current affairs commentaries, press releases, editorials, and

radio programs suddenly become flooded with the common

knowledge that “the emperor has no clothes”; that Lacan’s

difficult, even tortuous, discourse is nothing more than an

exercise in obscurantism of Joycean proportions; that Lacan’s

mathematical forays bear absolutely no relation to psycho-

analysis. Just imagine the relief and satisfaction! In a society

governed by the “sound-bite” imperative, we can now with

clear consciences set aside that weighty volume.

This story is not just a story. It is a story that goes some way

toward explaining the popularity of a recent bestseller by Alan

Sokal and Jean Bricmont (hereafter S&B), entitled Intellectual

Impostures (1997). It is a book in which the authors, both

scientists, take issue with the way mathematical science is

invoked in the works of a multitude of French intellectuals:

Kristeva, Irigaray, Latour, Baudrillard, Deleuze and Guattari,

Virilio, and Lacan.

Alan Sokal, professor of physics at NYU, in particular, has

taken upon himself the task of defending an orthodox concep-

tion of scientific discourse against an apparent assault originat-

ing in the Parisian intellectual scene—an assault that has

acquired hegemonic status in certain circles of Western

academia. He initiated his counterassault by writing a con-

sciously “bogus” piece on the hermeneutics of quantum gravity

and submitting it for publication. After the article was ac-

cepted and published in the journal Social Text (Sokal 1996a),

he promptly revealed it as a hoax—the so-called “Sokal hoax”

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(Sokal 1996b)—thus sparking an interesting and fruitful inter-

national debate on the intellectual standards of postmodern

academia (see Aronowitz 1997; Robbins 1996). Intellectual

Impostures , however, seeks to raise the stakes even further, thus

constituting a culmination of Sokal’s initial project.

In direct contrast with the work of Jacques Lacan, Intellec-

tual Impostures makes easy, even entertaining, reading. The

chapters, each devoted to a different French intellectual,

comprise a string of excerpts joined together with short

commentaries, often in the form of ironic interjections.

In this essay we focus mainly on their chapter on Lacan.

We shall put into question the main thrust of S&B’s critical

remarks aimed at undermining the legitimacy of Lacan’s style

and his use of mathematical science. But our aim is carefully

delimited. We do not argue that Lacan is easy or fun to read.

We do not offer detailed explanations of Lacanian concepts.

We do not show what new insights and ways of thinking he

brings to bear on questions of mental processes (except

indirectly). Nor do we offer reasons why Lacan is worth trying

hard to understand. Our argument is largely restricted to

showing why S&B fail to make a case against Lacan not only on

the basis of generally accepted standards of intellectual integ-

rity but also on the basis of standards of their own choosing.

Setting the Stage

In the preface to the English edition of their Intellectual

Impostures , S&B set aim at two distinct targets: (1) Intellectuals

who, they allege, abuse scientific and mathematical concepts.

Their recourse to the term “abuse,” no doubt, signals the

seriousness of the charge they are making; and they claim that

this abuse takes at least two—not necessarily unrelated—

forms. Either such concepts are invoked “without the slightest

justification” (ix) as to the matter under discussion or else they

are thrown about in order to lend authority to their statements

(vis-à-vis their predominantly nonscientific audience) without

“any regard for its relevance or even its meaning” (ix–x); and

(2) the epistemic relativism of “postmodern science,” the idea

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that “modern science is nothing more than a ‘myth’, a ‘narra-

tion’ or a ‘social construction’ among many others” (x).

Of course, both targets are not always to be found in the

work of each author they canvass. The second target, for

instance, is not to be found in the work of Lacan. We can thus

begin by establishing a point of convergence between S&B’s

view and Lacan’s on the status of science. Slavoj Zizek ad-

dresses exactly this point in the following passage:

What . . . is the nature of the difference between the

narrativist postmodernism and Lacan? Perhaps the best

way to approach it is via the gap which separates the

modern universe of science from traditional knowledge:

for Lacan, modern science is not just another local

narrative grounded in its specific pragmatic conditions,

since it does relate to the (mathematical) Real beneath

the symbolic universe. (1997, 159)

While Lacan might thus be construed as sympathetic to

S&B’s attack on epistemic relativism, 1 we already have, in this

very same passage, the thin edge of a more explicit divergence

of opinion, namely, the appeal to a mathematical Real. After

all, Lacan is quite explicit in claiming, on behalf of psycho-

analysis, that “[m]athematical formalization is our goal, our

ideal” (1975, 119)—which, it is perhaps worth pointing out, is

not at all the same thing as saying that it is the only, or even

primary, ideal of psychoanalysis. In any case, this is evidence of

the centrality Lacan gives to mathematical formalization in his

attempt to establish the way in which psychoanalysis may be

considered scientific. 2 As S&B also note, “Lacan’s predilection

for mathematics is by no means marginal in his work” (23).

But no sooner have we exempted Lacan from S&B’s

second class of targets than we have already hinted at why he

figures as their ultimate bête noire . For it is this very appeal to

mathematics, or rather the manner of his appeal, that, accord-

ing to Intellectual Impostures , brings Lacan squarely into the first

class of targets they take aim at: Lacan’s abuse of scientific and

mathematical concepts.

But in what way, exactly, does Lacan abuse mathematical

ideas? In order to determine of what kind of abuse Lacan is

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apparently most to blame, S&B very helpfully list four senses of

the term “abuse” in the introduction to Intellectual Impostures :

(1) Holding forth at length on scientific theories about

which one has, at best, an excedingly hazy idea. The

most common tactic is to use scientific (or pseudo–

scientific) terminology without bothering much about

what the words actually mean .

(2) Importing concepts from the natural sciences into

the humanities or social sciences without giving the

slightest conceptual or empirical justification. If a biolo-

gist wanted to apply, in her research, elementary notions

of mathematical topology, set theory, or differential

geometry, she would be asked to give some explanation.

A vague analogy would not be taken very seriously by her

colleagues. Here, by contrast, we learn from Lacan that

the structure of the neurotic subject is exactly the torus

(it is no less than reality itself . . . ) . . . .

(3) Displaying a superficial erudition by shamelessly

throwing around technical terms in a context where

they are completely irrelevant. The goal is, no doubt, to

impress and, above all, to intimidate the nonscientist

reader . . . .

(4) Manipulating phrases and sentences that are, in fact,

meaningless. Some of these authors exhibit a veritable

intoxication with words, combined with a superb indif-

ference to their meaning. (S&B 1997, 4)

Finally, at the beginning of the chapter devoted to Lacan, S&B

claim that he “illustrates perfectly, in different parts of his

oeuvre, the abuses listed” (17). And at the conclusion of the

same chapter, S&B state that Lacan “excels . . . at the second

type of abuse listed [above]” (34).

The aim of our short commentary will be to raise doubts

concerning S&B’s critique of Lacan, demonstrating the way it

misses its target; and this largely on account of S&B’s (acknowl-

edged) ignorance of psychoanalytic knowledge. We organize

our comments around questions of style and questions of

substance.

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